The article analyses how the norm against mercenarism shapes the legitimate parameters of exchange in the market for military outsourcing. The dominant interpretation of this dynamic is that neoliberal states and private military companies (PMCs) have come to restrict their transactions to non-combat functions in order to circumvent contemporary articulations of this norm. The article, by contrast, contends that even within these narrowed parameters of exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs have been required to work through the norm against mercenarism Using the global security assemblages approach and drawing upon new data relating to the UK case, it explores how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and PMCs have sought to appropriate symbolic capital from a domestic private security licencing regime so as to distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism. In so doing it facilitates a reappraisal of the regulatory potential of this norm within today s pluralised military landscape.
Introduction
The norm against mercenarism which condemns the practice of private soldiering played a significant role in the construction of the modern world order, contributing decisively towards the institutionalisation of the state monopoly over violence in the 19 th century (Percy 2007a) . For much of the 20 th century, it became an implicitly accepted feature of international politics as major wars were fought predominantly with state-controlled citizen armies (Thomson 1990 ). At the turn of the 21 st century, however, this norm has once again entered into the public consciousness in response to the controversial use of private military companies (PMCs) by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the height of these post-9/11 interventions, PMCs were deploying an estimated 54,000 armed contractors on the battlefields of the Middle East (Krahmann 2012: 344) , with many tens of thousands more carrying out a range of unarmed logistical and support functions (Heinecken 2014: 629) . This trend has prompted commentators far and wide from UN rapporteurs and international aid workers to investigative journalists and film makers to voice their grave concerns over the expansion of PMC operations which, they observe, not only seek to profit from warfare but also function beyond established chains of command (Kruck and Spencer 2013) . As a consequence, those actors seeking to participate in this controversial marketplace in particular, neoliberal states on the buying side and PMCs on the selling side have been required to navigate their transactions through contemporary articulations of the age-old norm against mercenarism. The article seeks to enhance our understanding of this important normative dynamic.
The most common interpretation of this dynamic pioneered by Percy (2007a Percy ( /b/c, 2014 Percy ( , 2016 and broadly reproduced throughout the field is that neoliberal states and PMCs have come to strategically restrict their transactions to non-combat (as opposed to combat) functions so as to circumvent contemporary articulations of the norm against mercenarism. Extending this interpretation, a further group of scholars in particular, Leander (2010) , Berndtsson (2012) and Joachim and Schneiker (2012) implicitly suggest that even within these narrowed parameters of market exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs have been compelled to confront and work through these constraints by actively aligning their non-combat transactions with counterposed norms such as the state monopoly over violence and/or international humanitarianism. The purpose of this article is to advance this nascent line of reasoning in a number of ways. In empirical terms, it illustrates how since the mid2000s the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and UK-based PMCs have sought to appropriate symbolic capital from the Security Industry Authority (SIA) the public body tasked with licensing the domestic private security labour market so as to distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism. In theoretical terms, it accordingly reveals a new level of interplay between the agency of neoliberal states and PMCs and the structural constraints arising from the norm against mercenarism an interplay which denotes a more extensive penetration of this norm into the market for military outsourcing than previously recognised. In practical terms, it indicates how this newly identified normative dynamic could be used to better align these non-combat transactions with the public interest.
The argument unfolds over four sections. The next section reviews the extant literature on the norm against mercenarism both to set the scene and to highlight the contribution of the article. The following section maps out the article s organising perspective namely, Abrahamsen contexts and the term private security is attached to those companies and labour markets operating in domestic policing contexts. These terminological specifications also serve to highlight the interdisciplinary scope of the article, which not only contributes towards our sociological understanding of the norm against mercenarism, but more broadly stands at the crossroads of international relations, international law and criminology (Bigo 2016) .
Context
The default narrative on the rise of the market for military outsourcing follows a distinctly rationalist neoclassical economic logic, emphasizing a series of supply/demand shifts which unfolded against the backdrop of the geopolitical and geoeconomic transformations of the late 1980s and early 1990s (for overviews see:
Singer 2008: 49-60; Rosen 2008: 78-80; Heinecken 2014: 627-630 (Rosen 2008: 79-80) . The market for military outsourcing then experienced a further period of rapid expansion following the post-9/11 interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Coalition forces found themselves facing down unexpected resistance from insurgents and once again turned to this market in order to compensate for a shortfall in frontline capacity (Isenberg 2009 ).
Despite the rationalist neoclassical economic orientation of this narrative, it is nevertheless widely acknowledged that these transactions were not taking place in an unfettered marketplace. From the outset they were structured by, among other things, legacies of colonialism and racial inequalities (Chisholm 2015) , gender politics (Eichler 2015) and our concern here regulatory prohibitions arising from the norm against mercenarism. The most instructive starting point for understanding the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market exchange is the work of Percy (2007a Percy ( /b/c, 2014 Percy ( , 2016 . She begins her analysis of these variables by assuming a loose constructivist approach which rests upon two basic analytical propositions: first, as elite actors pursue their rational interests in the international sphere they are required to negotiate their way through a series of deeply embedded intersubjective norms concerning the rightful constitution of the international order; second, this dialectical interplay between structure and agency is best captured using a narrative approach which empirically traces how elite actors (re)interpret and (re)shape these intersubjective norms across different historical contexts (Percy 2007a: 14-48) . Using these propositions, she illustrates how over recent decades neoliberal states and PMCs have attempted to transform and manipulate the hegemonic meaning of the norm against mercenarism so that it only criminalizes combat functions, thereby carving out a legitimate space for non-combat transactions within the contemporary marketplace.
This process, she observes, has taken place over three broad stages. Operations (ISO 18788) (Avant 2016; Krahmann 2016) . Crucially, all of these regimes were predicated on the legitimacy of non-combat transactions in the market for military outsourcing and thus served to consolidate this narrowed space of exchange. This leads Percy (2014: to conclude that Combat or the offensive use of force has become the defining factor of a mercenary, and the anti-mercenary norm is now restricted to those actors who use offensive force
This interpretation, which carefully balances the agency of neoliberal states and PMCs with the structural constraints arising from the norm against mercenarism, is highly persuasive and has rightly gained considerable traction across the field. That said, an additional group of constructivist scholars in particular, Leander (2010) , Berndtsson (2012) and Joachim and Schneiker (2012) have sought to push this line of argumentation further by (often implicitly) suggesting that even within these narrowed parameters of market exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs are required to confront and work through the norm against mercenarism. They have done so by making sociological sense of tell-tale behaviours in the market for military outsourcing. Leander (2010) , for example, points towards the revolving door of individuals moving between US public office and US-based PMC executive boards, observing how there is a strong pressure both on PMCs and states wishing to work with them to ensure that companies operations are as visibly and closely anchored to those of the state as possible (Leander 2010: 482) . This enmeshment of PMCs and states allows these actors to enhance the publicness Berndtsson of their non-combat transactions, thereby distancing them from ongoing articulations of the norm against mercenarism (Leander 2010: 482) . Similarly, Joachim and Schneiker (2012, p.375 ) note the tendency of US-and UK-based PMCs to shroud their operations in the discourse and symbolism of international humanitarianism by contributing to humanitarian charities, forging alliances with and recruiting from humanitarian organizations, appropriating humanitarian imagery such as the symbol for the United Nation global compact and covering their websites with references to human rights. These practices, they reason, help PMCs to rid themselves of the mercenary and Rambo-type image and to establish themselves as regular security actors .
While it is not necessarily their explicit intention, these analyses deepen our understanding of the relationship between mercenarism, norms and market exchange.
In empirical terms, they indicate that, even within the supposedly legitimated space of market exchange demarcated by Percy, neoliberal states and PMCs have been required to circumvent the norm against mercenarism by aligning their operations with counterposed norms relating to the state monopoly over violence and/or international humanitarianism. In theoretical terms, they bring into frame a new kind of interplay between the agency of neoliberal states and PMCs and the structural constraints arising from the norm against mercenarism. These emergent empirical and theoretical lines of enquiry are picked up and further developed throughout the ensuing case study, which illustrates how since the mid-2000s the FCO and UK-based PMCs following a similar logic to the aforementioned revolving door and discursive alignment strategies have sought to appropriate symbolic capital from the SIA in order to distance their noncombat transactions from the norm against mercenarism. Before commencing with this discussion, however, it is first necessary to map out the theoretical and methodological approaches which underpin this case study narrative.
Theory and Method
In recent years, scholars of military and security governance have advanced a range of organising perspectives to describe, explain and evaluate the pluralisation of the contemporary military landscape, each of which has variable utility depending on the precise questions under examination (for an overview see: Kruck 2014 To begin with, Williams (2009, 2011) borrow from the basic conceptual vocabulary of assemblage theory. In laying out this vocabulary, it is useful to make a distinction between assemblage-as-noun and assemblage-as-verb. As a noun, it refers to a particular configuration of socio-spatial relations an assemblage As a verb, it relates to the structure-agency dialectics which bring such configurations into effect the process of assembling The generality of these terms is the strength of the theory, for it facilitates the description and explanation of a fluid and ever changing social world in which there are no ontological certainties (Anderson and McFarlane 2011 Bourdieu (1990 Bourdieu ( , 1999 ) that symbolic capital (legitimacy and authority) carries the most significance, especially the symbolic capital of the state (see also Diphoorn and Grassiani 2016) .
History weighs heavily on the security field they explain the very origins of the modern (and later liberal democratic) state were defined by its opposition to the notion of private security )n the modern state security was to become a public function (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 111-2) . It is this state-centric historical bearing encompassing, among other social structures, the conjoined norms against mercenarism and for the state monopoly over violence which compels so many actors in the capacity development phase to enhance the publicness of their security operations through the realization of the symbolic capital of the state (see also White 2010 White , 2012 Diphoorn and Grassiani 2016) . Expressed differently, they draw attention to a distinctive structure-agency dynamic rooted in the historical terrain of the security field.
To summarise, the global security assemblages approach (as depicted here) advances three interconnected propositions:
i) global security assemblages are newly emergent socio-spatial configurations in the security field which may or may not correspond with conventional demarcations of state and market;
ii) the processes of assembly which bring these configurations into effect tend to unfold over three phases disassembly, capacity development and reassembly;
iii) the capacity development phase is characterised by a distinctive structure-agency dynamic in which participating actors seek to realise the symbolic capital of the state in an attempt to navigate their way through a series of deeply embedded state-centric norms.
In the following section, these propositions are used to organise the empirics of this case study into three phases: a disassembly phase in which the FCO contracts out formerly sovereign non-combat protective functions to UK-based PMCs; a capacity development phase in which both sets of actors seek to infuse these functions with the symbolic capital of the state in an effort to distance themselves from contemporary articulations of the norm against mercenarism; and a reassembly phase in which all individual contractors caught up in these transactions are required to carry an SIA licence, thereby creating a novel global security assemblage which defies conventional state-market demarcations. Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss the origins of the data on which this case study is based.
The article seeks to make sociological sense of tell-tale behaviours displayed by the FCO and UK-based PMCs in the market for military outsourcing. It does so using The most straightforward answer is that through this stipulation the formal benefits of the SIA licensing regime to reduce criminality and to raise standards would be translated from the domestic private security labour market into the international private military labour market. In other words, it would serve to realize a key form of economic capital improved quality in the labour market. However, there is reason to challenge this answer. To begin with, the SIA-accredited training programmes were devised for low risk CP work in the UK and had only limited applicability to high risk CP work in Iraq and Afghanistan The SIA licence has competency tests which only make sense in environments like the UK one executive remarks it has no relevance to hostile environments E ). One contractor articulates this concern in slightly more prosaic terms There s a CP course and a CP course The shit on the market the S)A have accredited is not good enough (C1). Furthermore, there are no regulatory mechanisms (e.g. inspection visits) by which the SIA can monitor and enforce its licensing regime in the international private military labour market a deficiency about which the FCO was already acutely aware (FCO 2002, p.24) . This lack of monitoring capacity also explains why there is no record of how many SIA CP licences have circulated through the international private military labour market there is simply no paper trail beyond the UK. All things considered, there appears to be only a very limited amount of latent economic capital bound up within the SIA CP licence, meaning this straightforward answer fails to persuade on its own.
Drawing upon Abrahamsen and William s insights into capacity development, an alternative answer is that through this stipulation the less formal benefits of the SIA licensing regime the realization of symbolic capital within the statecentric security field would be translated from the domestic private security labour market into the international private military labour market. In principle, the mechanics involved in unlocking this symbolic capital run as follows. Individuals seeking to work on any contract containing this stipulation must go through the SIA CP licence application process which includes, among other things, a criminal records check and a mandatory training course. Upon successful completion, they will be issued a photocard with a unique identification number set against the backdrop of the regallooking SIA kitemark (SIA 2013) (see Figure 1 ). This photocard is symbolically powerful. The holder is endorsed not just by the SIA, but also tracing the democratic line of accountability upwards the Home Office, Government, Parliament and, ultimately, the public. )t is in other words a physical manifestation of the state s democratic authority (White 2010) . The value of this particular form of symbolic capital within the market for military outsourcing is that it potentially helps to shield neoliberal states and PMCs against the critique that their non-combat transactions stand in violation of the norm against mercenarism. It communicates to onlookers that they are employing professional contractors endorsed and controlled by the democratic state, not cowboy mercenaries. In short, it gives them a form of legitimacy and authority they otherwise lack. Kruck and Spencer (2013, p.331 ) discovered that the four most dominant narrative characterizations of PMCs were as dirty mercenaries uncontrolled abusers exploiting war profiteers and incompetent cowboys .
Despite the relative absence of scandals involving the UK Government and UK-based
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PMCs, the norm against mercenarism was clearly finding voice in UK public discourse.
It therefore seems likely that the FCO and UK-based PMCs would not only seek to proactively defend themselves against such critiques arising from the norm against mercenarism, but would proceed do so by appropriating the readily accessible symbolic capital offered by the SIA CP licence.
Speaking to this line of reasoning, one civil servant working for the SIA at the time recalls how:
The FCO saw the sector as a hot potato You know Blackwater etc They didn t want UK companies to be associated with torture and killing because of how it would reflect on the UK So they the FCO looked at how they could put some form of regulation on UK companies operating in hostile environments and chatted to the SIA (CS1).
Reinforcing this logic, another civil servant remembers how for PMCs it [the SIA CP licence] was a badge that, in the absence of any other badges, companies grasped in the early days of )raq CS )t meant one executive continues if there was a problem we could say look the UK government licensed this person E ). Another expands on this theme: we don t formally need an S)A CP licence [by law], but a large number of our clients ask for it. Our clients like SIA licences. They re reassured by the piece of paper )t certainly helps to get us business (E4). Neatly summing up this process, one SAS solider-turned contractor notes in his autobiography of the post-9/11 private military labour market:
The SIA has nothing to do with hostile environments, but that hasn t stopped themselves from torture and killing in the market for military outsourcing through the deployment of a badge or piece of paper which conjures up the reassuring presence of government seem to coalesce around a single overarching point: in this state-centric marketplace, deeply permeated by the norm against mercenarism, these actors were using the SIA CP licence as a form of symbolic capital in order to enhance the publicness and by extension legitimacy and authority of their still tainted non-combat transactions.
It thus seems more likely that the FCO and UK-based PMCs were seeking to realize symbolic rather than economic capital from the SIA licensing regime. Yet it is important to emphasise that these two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive they may in fact be entwined. For instance, in their Bourdieu-inspired study of how different forms of capital are realized in the Kenyan, Jamaican and Israeli markets for security, Diphoorn and Grassiani (2016) note how actors first seek to accumulate readily accessible forms of economic, social and cultural capital, before eventually translating and converting it into symbolic capital a process they term securitizing capital Different forms of capital do not therefore necessarily exist in silos they can instead be co-constitutive. Applying this observation to the present discussion, the capacity development phase is perhaps best summed up as a process through which the FCO and UK-based PMCs sought to translate and convert readily accessible forms of economic capital such as the SIA CP licence into symbolic capital so as to legitimate their non-combat transactions in the face of critiques arising from the norm against mercenarism.
Regardless of the precise mechanisms at play, however, this capacity 
